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Comment
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.:
An Equitable Solution to the Uncertainty Behind the
Doctrine of Equivalents
Joseph F Haag*
In a 1995 decision, Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-
Jenkinson Co.,' the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed a jury's finding of patent infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.2 The court constructed its opinion to
conform with the current law of patent infringement and to
settle recent disparities in infringement analysis. The Federal
Circuit, however, missed an opportunity to establish a coherent
and predictable approach for determining infringement when an
accused infringer's device does not fall under the literal language
of a patent claim.
Courts historically have struggled to balance the problem of
providing adequate patent protection for patentees with the need
to provide proper notice to the public of what the patent
protects.' If the law limits a patentee to protection for only the
literal language in the patent claims, a competitor need only
make slight changes to the patented product to sidestep the
language while still copying the substance of the invention. The
doctrine of equivalents protects a patentee from a competitor
who makes merely "insubstantial" changes to a patented device
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S.M.E.
1994, Northwestern University.
1. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 1014 (1996). The Federal Circuit decided the Hilton Davis case on
August 8, 1995. Id.
2. The common law doctrine of equivalents allows a patent holder to
recover for infringement of its patent when an accused product or process does
not fall within the literal words of the patent claim, but instead substitutes
insubstantial changes to the claimed device or process. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co.
v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 606 (1950); see also infra Part I.B.
(describing the standard for infringement doctrine of equivalents).
3. See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing the trade-off
between justice for the patentee and notice to the public).
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to avoid literal infringement.4 On the other hand, although it
protects patentees beyond the literal language of the claims in
patents, the doctrine creates uncertainty for competitors as to
what will or will not infringe a patent. Hilton Davis addressed
the test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and
discussed whether the judge should have the discretion to decide
whether to apply the doctrine.5 In Hilton Davis, the Federal
Circuit' provided an overly broad test for infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents leaving its application more unreliable
and unpredictable than ever.
This Comment examines the test for infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents and concludes that additional restraints
are necessary to protect accused infringers from improper
broadening of patent claims beyond the literal claim language.
Part I outlines general principles of patent law and summarizes
the current law for infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents. Part II describes the reasoning and holding of the Federal
Circuit in Hilton Davis. Part III critiques the court's reasoning
on the standard for infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents and exposes the aspects that lead to unrestrained use of
the doctrine. Finally, Part III proposes an alternative to Hilton
Davis that excludes any evidence relating to the mental state of
4. See infra part I.B.1. (describing the protections provided by the doctrine
of equivalents).
5. The Federal Circuit in Hilton Davis addressed three issues: whether a
finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents involves any
additional proof beyond a finding that the accused process or device performs
substantially the same function, in the same way, to achieve the same result as
the process or device claimed by the patent; whether infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents is a factual question to be given to the jury or an
equitable remedy to be applied by the court; and whether the trial court can use
discretion in deciding whether to apply the doctrine of equivalents in a given
patent infringement suit. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516.
6. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit exercises exclusive
jurisdiction over patent and trademark appeals from the U.S. district courts and
from the Patent Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1) (1994). Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 to replace the
dual system of appellate jurisdiction previously provided for patent cases.
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Appeals for patent
infringement cases were previously dealt with by the individual circuit courts
while appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office on patent applications
were heard by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1994) (stating that "[tihe courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States"); 35 U.S.C.
§ 141 (1986) (governing appeals to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals).
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the accused infringer, considers the policy situations when an
infringement finding under the doctrine is appropriate, and
rigidly applies prosecution history estoppel to limit application
of the doctrine.
I. PATENT LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS
A. FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT LAW
A patent grants a patentee the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling an invention within the United States
for up to twenty years from the date the patent application is
filed with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).7 In ex-
change for this legal "monopoly,"' the patent holder must fully
disclose the invention to the public,9 adding to the pool of public
7. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994) (granting the
patent owner the "right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale,
or selling the invention throughout the United States"). Until recently, the
period of a patent was seventeen years from the date of its issuance. The period
of a patent is now twenty years from the date that the patent application is
filed with the PTO. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994) (stating the "grant shall be
for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20
years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed"). This
change was made to help conform United States patent law to that in other
countries, and to prevent delay in the prosecution of a patent so as to extend
the patent term.
8. Technically, the right is not the grant of a legal "monopoly," but rather
an exclusionary right for the patented invention. The patent does not
necessarily allow the patent holder to practice her invention. See 4 DONALD S.
CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND
INFRINGEMENT § 16.02(1) (1995) (describing the exclusive right patents grant
and the limits that other patents or the law may impose on the patent right).
"Monopoly" has a negative connotation because it implies that something has
been taken from the public domain. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser
Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (discussing the term "monopoly"). A patent, on
the other hand, does not deprive the public of what was already in the public
domain, but instead rewards the inventor for disclosing valuable knowledge to
the public. See 1 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.03 (2d
ed. 1995) (comparing patents and monopolies).
9. The statutory measures provide:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated
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scientific knowledge. A patent consists of a specification with
one or more claims that set forth the elements of the invention
that the patentee seeks to protect.' ° The specification describes
the invention in detail and teaches the best mode of practicing
the invention." The claims constitute the essence of the legal
right granted by a patent and define the boundaries of the
property right.'2
The United States uses the "peripheral" claiming system,
whereby applicants negotiate with the PTO to describe the outer
limits of the invention in the claims." During a process known
as patent prosecution, an applicant files a patent application
with the PTO, which reviews the application and rejects claims
that are not patentable. 4 Under this system, the claims of an
by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
10. A patent application includes a specification and an oath, and may also
include one or more drawings. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994); see also id. § 112
(requiring that patents include specifications that "conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention"); id. § 113 (requiring a drawing
where necessary to understand the subject matter of the patent); id. § 115
(requiring the applicant to make an oath that "he believes himself to be the
original and first inventor of the process [or] machine").
11. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994); see also supra note 9 (quoting the language of
the patent statute describing the specification). The specification must allow
one skilled in the art to construct the product. It names all of the parts of the
invention, describes how it works, and illustrates how the components work to
perform the function.
12. DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW § 2D[31[d] (1992). Each new element written into a claim
further narrows the subject matter protected by the claim, such that with fewer
elements the patentee would claim more subject matter. Id. A patent claim
usually consists of a preamble, a transition, and a body. The preamble is an
introductory phrase that summarizes the invention or its intended uses. 2
CHISUM, supra note 8, § 8.06[l][b]. The transition is a phrase that serves to
connect the preamble to the body. Id. The body is a recitation of the elements
that define the product or process. Id. For a thorough discussion of the
mechanics of drafting patent claims, see generally ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON
MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (3d ed. 1990).
13. The outer limits of the invention are often referred to as the "metes and
bounds" of the invention. See ROSENBERG, supra note 8, § 19.01[3] (describing
the "peripheral" claiming system). The Patent Act of 1870 specified that the
claimant must "particularly point out and distinctly claim" the invention; this
language inspired the United States to move to a peripheral definition system
in which the claim determines the scope of protection. C. Leon Kim, Transition
from Central to Peripheral Definition Patent Claim Interpretation System in
Korea, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 401, 403-04 (1995).
14. There are four requirements for patentability: patentable subject
matter, utility, novelty, and nonobvious subject matter. Section 101 of the
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issued patent 5 describe to the public the outer limits of what
the patent protects and allow inventors to identify whether their
device' 6 infringes the patent.'"
Some European countries employ, as an alternative to the
peripheral claiming system, the "central" claiming system.'8 In
central claiming, courts do not hold the patentee to a rigid
definition of the invention derived in patent prosecution. 9
Instead, courts must define the scope of patent protection by
examining the novelty of the invention described in the patent
patent code encompasses the utility and subject matter requirements, stating,
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Some subject matter, such as
mathematical equations and scientific principles, is not considered patentable
because it is considered a thing of nature. See 1 CHISUM, supra note 8, § 1
(detailing the subject matter limits for patent protection); John A. Burtis,
Comment, Toward a Rational Jurisprudence of Computer-Related Patentability
in Light of In re Alappat, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1129 (1995) (same). Novelty
requires that the inventor be the first to invent the device and bars an inventor
from waiting more than one year after using or selling an invention before
applying for a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). The nonobviousness requirement
bars an inventor from patenting a device that "would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains." Id. § 103 (1994). See generally Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (discussing the test and considerations for
determining obviousness).
15. Any patent that the PTO allows becomes an issued patent and
maintains a presumption of validity during a subsequent trial. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1994) (describing the issuance of patents); id. § 282 (providing that a
patent is presumed valid).
16. As used throughout this article, "device" refers to any machine, product,
or process set forth in a patent. Therefore, the term refers to both apparatus
and process claims.
17. See General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369
(1938) (stating that the inventor must inform the public of the limits of patent
protection in claims so that others may know the features that may be used
without a license); 1 CHISUMI, supra note 8, § 8.04 (noting that patent claims
must distinctly set forth protected subject matter).
18. Central claiming is also known as "inventive concept claiming."
Peripheral claiming gets its name from the theory that the claims are broad and
then the courts limit from the periphery inward. John A. Dienner, Claims of
Patents, 18 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 389, 391-92 (1936). In central
claiming, an inventor claims the central thought of the invention and then
courts extend the invention outwardly to include equivalents. Id. For a
comparative overview of foreign patent systems see 3 ROSENBERG, supra note
8, 88 19.00-19.04.
19. In some countries with a central claiming system the patent may issue
with no claims at all. See 3 ROSENBERG, supra note 8, § 19.01[3] (discussing
such claiming systems).
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during the course of litigation."
The distinctions between claiming systems become impor-
tant during litigation for patent infringement. In countries with
a central claiming system, the court defines the scope of the
patent during litigation, essentially constructing the elements of
the invention.2 Peripheral claiming, on the other hand, puts
responsibility on the inventor to adequately describe the
invention during patent prosecution,22 rather than defining the
invention through the judiciary during litigation.
In the United States, the patent statute defines patent
infringement when one "without authority makes, uses or sells
any patented invention, within the United States during the
term of the patent therefor."' Courts follow a two-step process
in patent infringement analysis. 24 The court first must ascer-
tain the meaning of the language setting forth the patented
device in the claims.25 This process, known as claim interpreta-
tion, presents a legal issue for the court.26 The court next must
compare the accused and claimed devices to determine whether
the accused device constitutes the same invention as that
20. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Federal Circuit Bar Association at 7 n.1,
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(per curiam) (en banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996) [hereinafter Amicus
Curiae Brief] (describing the use of central claiming in Germany prior to 1980
where courts determined the breadth of patent protection during litigation).
21. Id. at 7 n.1; see also 3 ROSENBERG, supra note 8, § 19.01[3] (discussing
the central claiming system).
22. See supra notes 13-14 (describing patent prosecution and requirements
for patentability). Although a court may still hold a patent invalid during trial,
the patent claims already set forth the elements and scope of the invention and
only require interpretation by the court.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
24. Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
25. Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1034 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Snellman v. Ricoh Co., 862 F.2d 283, 286 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
26. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 40 (1995). The Federal Circuit in
Markman gave three reasons why claim interpretation should be for the court:
first, construction of written evidence has long been left to the court to decide
in American law; second, competitor's should be able to ascertain to a
reasonable degree the scope of the patent rights; and third, the competitors
should be assured that a judge, trained in the law, will apply rules of
construction in a way to arrive at a consistent scope of the patent. Id. at 978-
79. The Federal Circuit also discussed the role of the Seventh Amendment in
patent cases in Markman, holding that a court's construction of patent claims
does not deprive parties of the right to a jury trial. Id. at 984.
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described in the claims.27
Courts compare the accused and claimed devices under two
standards: literal infringement and infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. Literal infringement occurs when the
accused device embodies each and every element of one or more
claims in the patent.28  The patentee will seek to invoke the
doctrine of equivalents if the accused device does not literally
infringe the claimed invention. A device infringes a claimed
invention under the doctrine of equivalents when the accused
device is substantially equivalent to the claims of the patent, yet
remains outside the literal language of the claims.29
B. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
1. Purpose and Development of the Doctrine
Two competinginterests shape the doctrine ofequivalents: the
patentee's exclusive right to the claimed invention" and the
public's right to know the limits of the patent's protection."' The
doctrine offers a means for providing justice 2 to a patentee to
27. Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1574 (Fed.
Cir. 1991); Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448,452 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
28. Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 902 (1991); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868
F.2d 1251, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1989). One way to refer to literal infringement is to
say the claims "read on" the accused device.
29. Environmental Instruments, Inc. v. Sutron Corp., 877 F.2d 1561, 1565
(Fed. Cir. 1989); see also infra part I.B. (discussing the doctrine of equivalents).
Literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is not
determined by comparing the accused device to the patented device, but rather
by comparing the accused device to the claims of the patented device. Martin
v. Barber, 755 F.2d 1564, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
30. See supra note 7 (discussing the exclusive right granted to patentees by
the Constitution).
31. Judge Nies of the Federal Circuit wrote: "As a matter of due process
under the fifth amendment, reasonable notice must be given to the public of
what conduct must be avoided. Whether in civil or criminal proceedings, it is
unequivocally established that that basic right to notice applies." Pennwalt
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 954 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(Nies, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988); see also International
Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(Lourie, J., concurring) (stating that it is important for the public to be able to
rely on the claims of a patent to define the "metes and bounds" of the
invention).
32. In some situations the law should protect the patentee because "the law
is to benefit the inventor's genius and not the scrivener's talents." Autogiro Co.
of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The doctrine also
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ameliorate the harsh requirements of the peripheral claiming
system."3 At the same time, those who practice in the same field
deserve notice of the patented invention in order to avoid infringe-
ment.34 Application of the doctrine of equivalents involves a
trade-offbetweenjustice to the patentee and notice to the public.3 5
serves a commercial purpose by rewarding the originator of new technology over
the infringer who bore neither the cost of creation nor the burden of failure.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1531 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (per curiam) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
1014 (1996).
33. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (describing the require-
ments for claims in the peripheral claiming system). The peripheral claiming
system, by its nature, values notice to the public over justice to the patentee.
The doctrine of equivalents evens this balance by enlarging the protection given
to the patentee. One rationale for the doctrine of equivalents follows:
If patents were interpreted only by the literal scope of their claims,
however, minor deviations in the structure of almost any invention
could be devised to elude the reach of the patent's protection. Thus,
experience with patent cases demonstrates that seldom may the
question of infringement be determined on the literal words of the
claim. In recognition of the fact that a patent would be virtually
worthless if it did not protect against devices which incorporate
unimportant variations of the patented device ....
Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 483 F.2d 858, 868 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1079 (1973).
The doctrine of equivalents is used in two situations. The most common
use is to allow the patentee to cover subject matter that was mistakenly not
claimed during prosecution. Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The
Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not
Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 715 (1989). The second use is to allow
protection for technological innovation that developed after the patent issued
that an accused infringer substitutes for a limitation in the claim. Id. at 712.
The prevailing view today is that new technology can be equivalent to the older
technology. ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 702 (1992). Compare Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950) (stating that equivalency is determined by looking
at whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the
interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that
was) with Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805
F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("It is not required that those skilled in the art
knew, at the time the patent application was filed, of the asserted equivalence
means of performing the claimed functions; that equivalent is determined as of
the time infringement takes place."). Courts may also apply the doctrine of
equivalents against the patentee. The "reverse doctrine of equivalents" protects
an accused infringer by preventing infingement when the accused device falls
within the literal words of the claims, but functions in a substantially different
way. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608-09.
34. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 20, at 4. Competitors also need to be
able to rely on the claim language to determine the scope of protection.
35. Id. at 7. Providing better notice for the public imposes injustice on the
patentee while awarding protection for the patentee causes improper notice to
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In 1853, the Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of
equivalents in Winans v. Denmead.5 In Winans, the patentee
claimed a cylindrical railroad car, but the accused's railroad car
was pyramidal in structure.3 ' The Court held that the accused
car infringed, stating, "to copy the principle or mode of operation
described is an infringement, although such copy should be
totally unlike the original in form or proportions." 8
The Supreme Court shaped the modern structure of the
doctrine of equivalents in its 1950 Graver Tank decision. 9 In
Graver Tank, Linde, the patentee, sued Graver Tank for
infringing a patent on a welding flux.4° Graver Tank's flux
used manganese, which is not an alkaline earth metal silicate as
the patent for Linde's flux specified.4 The Court held the
patent infringed because the manganese in Graver Tank's flux
and the alkaline earth metals in Linde's patent had the same
function and operated in the same way to achieve the same
result.42 Although the Court stated that the doctrine of equiva-
the public.
36. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
37. Id. at 331-32.
38. Id. at 342. In reaching its conclusion, the Court recognized that the
whole substance and structure, mode of operation, and the results were the
same for both the accused and claimed devices. Id. at 342.
39. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605
(1950). The Graver Tank decision is the most recent Supreme Court discussion
of the doctrine of equivalents.
40. Id. at 606. A welding flux is a blanket of molten metal compounds used
to protect freshly deposited molten metal during the welding process.
41. Id. at 610. Linde's patent claimed "essentially a combination of alkaline
earth metal silicate and calcium fluoride."
42. Id. at 611. The Court in Graver Tank stated: "Outright and forthright
duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement. To prohibit no other
would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating
substance to form.... The essence of the doctrine [of equivalents] is that one
may not practice a fraud on a patent." Id. at 607-08. Justice Douglass dissent
pointed out that manganese was used similarly in prior expired patents and
that this should have prevented the patentee from claiming it. Id. at 618
(Douglas, J., dissenting). The Graver Tank majority, however, apparently
thought that the prior art did not teach the combination of the flux with the
other elements of the claimed invention. MERGES, supra note 33, at 665.
Justice Black, dissenting in Graver Tank, argued that the majority's holding
would "make enlargement of patent claims the rule rather than the exception."
Id. at 616 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black wrote:
The Court's ruling today sets the stage for more patent "fraud" and
"piracy" against business than could be expected from faithful
observance of the congressionally enacted plan to protect business
against judicial expansion of precise patent claims. Hereafter a
manufacturer cannot rely on what the language of a patent claims. He
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lents encompasses "insubstantial" changes4 3 between the
accused and claimed devices, the test that lower courts drew
from Graver Tank is the tripartite "function-way-result" test,44
which states that a device infringes a patent if it performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to obtain the same result.
45
2. Limitations on the Application of the Doctrine
Although the function-way-result test may seem potentially
boundless in application, a number of built-in limitations temper
the application of the doctrine of equivalents. One limitation is
the nature of the patented invention-an "improvement" patent
in a crowded field of prior art is entitled to a narrower range of
equivalents 4s than a "pioneering"47 invention. The inventor
who forges ahead in uncharted waters receives broader protec-
tion than the patentee who makes slight yet patentable changes
over the prior art.41 Courts reason that the doctrine of equiva-
lents should provide broad protection for the pioneering inventor
must be able, at the peril of heavy infringement damages, to forecast
how far a court relatively unversed in a particular technological field
will expand the claim's language after considering the testimony of
technical experts in that field. To burden business enterprise on the
assumption that men possess such a prescience bodes ill for the kind
of competitive economy that is our professed goal.
Id. at 617.
43. Id. at 610. What constitutes an "insubstantial" change is difficult to
define. One Federal Circuit decision defined "insubstantial" as a "minor
modification" to the patented device. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
44. Very similar tests existed prior to Graver Tank. See, e.g., Machine Co.
v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1878) (stating that infringement occurs where the
"two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish
substantially the same result").
45. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
46. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863 F.2d 855,861
n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989) (stating that pioneer
inventions are entitled to a broader range of equivalents than nonpioneering
inventions); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 805
F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that "the range of permissible
equivalents depends upon the extent and nature of the invention, and may be
more generously interpreted for a basic invention than for a less dramatic
technological advance").
47. A pioneer patent is a patent covering a wholly novel device, a function
never before performed, or one that marks a distinct step forward in the art, as
opposed to a mere improvement or perfection of what was done before.
48. The term "prior art" refers to issued patents, printed publications, or
known inventions.
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because drafting the specification and claims for pioneer patents
is difficult due to the new scientific ground broken by the unique
invention.49
A second constraint on application of the doctrine of
equivalents stems from a patentee's inability to expand the
protection of a patent through the doctrine to encompass the
prior art.5 ° This prior art limitation prevents an attempt to
broaden claims to encompass pre-existing innovation and further
prevents the claiming of what the prior art anticipates or makes
obvious." This limitation constitutes a practical reason why
courts allow a narrower range of equivalents to improvement
patents in a crowded field than for pioneering inventions.
A patentee also may not receive protection through the
doctrine of equivalents for subject matter that it conceded to the
PTO in obtaining the patent.52 This provides another restraint
49. Moore v. United States, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 800, 806 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
50. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d
677, 684 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990) (setting forth an analysis
to determine whether the expanded claim covers the prior art); Senmed, Inc. v.
Richard-Allan Medical Indus., 888 F.2d 815, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that
a "claim cannot be given a range of equivalents so wide as to cause the claim
to encompass anything in the prior art"). The Wilson court set forth a
"hypothetical" claim approach to determine whether the prior art should limit
the patentee. The court conceptualized a hypothetical claim broad enough to
encompass the accused product. Wilson, 904 F.2d at 684. The court then
determined whether the PTO would allow the hypothetical claim over the prior
art. Id. If the PTO would allow the hypothetical claim, the prior art would not
limit the patent protection. Id. If the PTO would not allow the hypothetical
claim, the prior art would prevent the patentee from obtaining protection. Id.
For an argument against the hypothetical claim approach, see Henrik D.
Parker, The Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis After Wilson Sporting Goods: The
Hypothetical Claim Hydra, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 262, 288 (1990)
(arguing that presentation to jury of "hypothetical claim" will complicate
matters and confuse the jury).
51. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1994) (setting forth that to be patentable, an
invention must be novel and must not be obvious); see also supra note 14
(discussing the prerequisites for patentability).
52. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
"[Wihen a patentee, during the prosecution of his application, adds a limitation
... in response to a rejection based on prior art references ... in an effort to
overcome that rejection, the patentee cannot later successfully argue that an
accused device that lacks the... limitation infringes the patent." Dixie USA,
Inc. v. Infab Corp., 927 F.2d 584 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also 4 CHISUM, supra note
8, § 18.05 (discussing prosecution history estoppel and its scope and effect).
Prosecution history estoppel is used only for an infringement analysis under the
doctrine of equivalents, and not for a literal infringement inquiry. Fromson v.
Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The
prosecution history, however, will be used as legislative history for claim
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on the application of the doctrine. The accused infringer may
use this constraint, known as prosecution history estoppel,53 as
a defense by holding the patentee to representations made to the
PTO.54 Because patentees make amendments to patent claims
for a variety of reasons, courts usually inquire into the reason
for these concessions in determining the effect of the prosecution
history."
interpretation. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966).
53. The history of a patent application is embodied in a "file wrapper." The
file wrapper includes the prosecution history of a patent, containing such
information as amendments, statements, and replies made to the PTO to obtain
a patent. Prosecution history estoppel is sometimes referred to as file wrapper
estoppel, although the Federal Circuit prefers the former term to the latter.
Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1485 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 924 (1984).
54. Carman Ind., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The
estoppel applies to claim amendments to overcome rejections based on prior art
and to arguments submitted to obtain the patent. Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Dwyer v. United
States, 357 F.2d 978, 984 (Ct. Cl. 1966) and Coleco Indus., Inc. v. ITC, 573 F.2d
1247, 1257 (C.C.P.-A 1978)).
55. Loctite Corp., 781 F.2d at 871. The Loctite court stated:
Amendment of claims is a common practice in prosecution of patent
applications. No reason or warrant exists for limiting application of
the doctrine of equivalents to those comparatively few claims allowed
exactly as originally filed and never amended. Amendments may be
of different types and may serve different functions. Depending on the
nature and purpose of an amendment, it may have a limiting effect
within a spectrum ranging from great to small to zero.
Id. (quoting Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1362). The court stated further that the fact
the claims were narrowed "does not always mean that the doctrine of file
history estoppel completely prohibits a patentee from recapturing some of what
was originally claimed." Id. at 871 (quoting Bayer Aktiengesselschaft v. Duphar
Int'l Research, 738 F.2d 1237, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also LaBounty Mfg.,
Inc. v. ITC, 867 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (ruling that an
applicant's narrowing of a claim during prosecution does not automatically
prohibit the patentee from recapturing some of the surrendered subject matter);
Kurt F. James, Note, Patent Claims and Prosecution History Estoppel in the
Federal Circuit, 53 Mo. L. REV. 497, 500 (1988) (arguing that prosecution
history estoppel should be narrowly applied because the doctrine does not
require the critical element of reliance by the public or accused infringer).
Although the Federal Circuit has abandoned the view that any limitation
added during prosecution should bar the patentee from asserting equivalents
over the surrendered subject matter, older decisions have strictly limited
patentees to limitations during prosecution. See Nationwide Chem. Corp. v.
Wright, 584 F.2d 714, 718-19 (5th Cir. 1978) (confining the patentee "strictly to
the letter of the limited claims granted"); Ekco Prod. Co. v. Chicago Metallic
Mfg. Co., 347 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1965) (stating that "a patentee that has
narrowed his claim after rejection to secure allowance, is held strictly to the
letter of the limited claims granted").
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3. Uncertainty in the Doctrine of Equivalents
Although the purpose and definition of the doctrine of
equivalents may appear simple, the application of the doctrine
remains marred by uncertainty. 6 With respect to its applica-
tion, the Graver Tank Court remarked that equivalence "is not
the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered
56. See, e.g., Adelman & Francione, supra note 33, at 683 (stating that the
uncertainty generated by the doctrine of equivalents "frustrates and chills the
activities" of other inventors who are concerned about an infringement suit
based on the doctrine); Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr., The Doctrine of Equivalents:
Twelve Years of Federal Circuit Precedent Still Leaves Practitioners Wondering,
20 WlIM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1033, 1048 (1994) (stating that uncertainty exists in
every issue of the doctrine of equivalents); Paul C. Craane, Note, At the
Boundaries of Law and Equity: The Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit and
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 105, 106 (1992) (discussing the
lack of certainty the Federal Circuit has created for the doctrine of equivalents).
Despite its long recognition, courts have not constructed a precise test for
equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents. Comparing devices for similarity
in function, way, and result usually does not provide a simple test for a jury,
and may leave the jury confused. Courts have provided some guidance to the
fact finder by discussing the degree of similarity between the accused and the
claimed device that is necessary under the doctrine of equivalents. Even this
guidance, however, is not without uncertainty. The Graver Tank majority, for
example, espoused the "as a whole" approach. Under this approach, the court
compares the accused device to the patented invention as a whole, looking for
"striking overall similarities." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d
1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Other recent Federal Circuit cases using the "as
a whole" approach include Texas Instruments, Inc. v. ITC, 805 F.2d 1558, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1986) and Martin v. Barber, 755 F.2d 1564, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
More recently, the Federal Circuit endorsed an element-by-element approach,
which states that each limitation of the claimed device or process must appear
in the accused device to establish infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents. See Penwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988) (approving the use of an
element-by-element approach, stating "the district court correctly relied on an
element-by-element comparison to conclude there was no infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents"); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
822 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (using the element-by-element approach);
Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that
"[i]t is ... well settled that each element of a claim is material and essential,
and that in order for a court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the
presence of every element or its substantial equivalent in the accused device").
The court has diluted this strict "element-by-element" approach by modifying
the definition of a limitation to potentially include more than one element of a
patent claim. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. USA, Inc., 868 F.2d
1251, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The Federal Circuit's shift in emphasis toward an
element-by-element approach may show an awareness that the primary purpose
of the patent claims to determine infringement is eroded by use of the doctrine
of equivalents. Adelman & Francione, supra note 33, at 677.
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in a vacuum."57 Although the function-way-result test remains
the dominant test for equivalency," the Federal Circuit has
stated that the function-way-result test does not serve as the
only means for determining equivalence, but rather merely one
acceptable method.59
Uncertainty remains as to whether a patentee should meet
an "equitable threshold" before a court applies the doctrine of
equivalents." Although intent is not an element of infringe-
ment,6' some scholars argue that the patentee must present
evidence that the accused infringer acted in bad faith before the
court should apply the doctrine.6 2  The Graver Tank opinion
57. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609
(1950). The Graver Tank Court did provide additional considerations that may
help in equivalency determinations, stating, "[piroof [of equivalency] can be
made in any form: through testimony of experts or others versed in the
technology; by documents, including texts and treatises; and, of course, by the
disclosure of the prior art." Id.
58. See Cary W. Brooks, Equitable Triggers for Invoking the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 220, 221 (1994) (stating that
courts have recognized the function-way-result test as the sole equitable basis
for invoking the doctrine of equivalents).
59. Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
1991), reh'g en bane denied, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2039 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
504 U.S. 974 (1992). The Malta court stated, "while comparison of func-
tion/way/result is an acceptable way of showing that structure in an accused
device is the 'substantial equivalent' of a claim limitation, it is not the only way
to do so." Id.
60. See generally Cary W. Brooks, More on Equivalents, 76 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 620 (1994) (recognizing that many suggest that proof
of copying, or intent to copy, is a necessary element to invoke the doctrine of
equivalents); Andrei Iancu, A Two-Track Approach to the Doctrine of Equiva-
lents in Patent Law: Responding to Hilton Davis, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 325, 339-45
(1995) (proposing a two-track approach for the doctrine of equivalents that takes
copying and intent into consideration); see also Brooks, supra note 58, at 225
(stating that there are times when the function-way-result test may result in
equivalency when it is not equitable to hold the claimed and accused devices as
equivalents); Clarence J. Fleming, The Doctrine of Equivalents-Should it Be
Available in the Absence of Copying?, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Socy 233,
234 (1994) (arguing that copying should be a prerequisite to application of the
doctrine of equivalents, and that many cases suggest the necessity for copying).
61. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974). The patent
statute does not discuss intent of the accused infringer as a prerequisite for
patent infringement. The Constitution provides an exclusive right to an
invention to the patentee and does not suggest that the intent of the accused
infringer affects this exclusive right. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra
note 7 (quoting the Constitution and the patent statute's grant of an exclusive
right).
62. See supra note 60 (citing arguments for the need for bad faith to invoke
the doctrine of equivalents).
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itself raises questions as to the role of intent-related evidence
such as acts of copying, "designing around,"63 and independent
research in equivalence analysis. The Graver Tank Court twice
noted that the defendant presented no evidence to show that it
developed the accused process through independent research or
experiments.64 The Graver Tank Court also noted that the
purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to prevent the fraud on
a patent and to prevent the copyist from making insubstantial
changes to avoid the law.65 These remarks of the Graver Tank
Court fuel scholars' arguments that the patentee should meet an
equitable threshold before the doctrine applies.
Some commentators fear that instead of using the doctrine
sparingly to remedy injustice, the doctrine has become an
automatic second prong in infringement cases.66 Although
courts typically allow parties to present evidence for the doctrine
63. "Designing around" involves studying a patent and designing a new
device to avoid the coverage of the patent's claims. Designing around is a
positive result of our patent system. Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc.,
775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Designing around is not discouraged
because it brings a "steady flow of innovations to the marketplace." State
Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Designing around also can create more healthy competition in the economy.
64. "[Tlhe record contains no evidence of any kind to show that Lincolnweld
was developed as the result of independent research or experiments." Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 611 (1950). The Court
went on to note that "[without some explanation or indication that Lincolnweld
was developed by independent research, the trial court could properly infer that
the accused flux is the result of imitation rather than experimentation or
invention." Id. at 612.
65. Id. at 608. The Graver Tank Court stated that a copying limitation
"would leave room for-indeed encourage-the unscrupulous copyist to make
unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent which,
though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the
claim, and hence outside the reach of law." Id. at 607.
66. These scholars believe that a liberal use of the doctrine of equivalents
is harmful to the public. See Jean M. Barkley, The Doctrine of Equivalents
Analysis After Wilson Sporting Goods, 35 ARiz. L. REv. 765, 783 (1993)
(suggesting that courts should restrict use of the doctrine of equivalents to
prevent it from becoming an automatic second prong to every infringement
case); Fleming, supra note 60, at 234 (stating that the doctrine of equivalents
is "a second bite at the apple for the patent owner in attempting to prove
infringement."); Iancu, supra note 60, at 334 (1995) (noting that infringement
by equivalents has become an "automatic second prong to all infringement
suits"); see also International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d
768, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Lourie, J., concurring) ("[Tihe doctrine has its limits,
and I believe that a court must ensure that it achieves its intended purpose and
does not simply become an automatic means for expanding the scope of a claim
beyond that granted by examination.").
1526 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1511
of equivalents, recent Federal Circuit cases suggest an equiva-
lence analysis is not an automatic second prong after a literal
infringement analysis in every patent infringement case. 7
Many scholars raise the concern that patentees improperly use
the doctrine to broaden the claims beyond the words that serve
adequate notice to the public.6" Because the doctrine is an
"equitable" remedy, others argue that patentees should liberally
apply the doctrine to remedy injustice.69 Controversy remains
as to the necessity of an equitable trigger to invoke the doctrine
of equivalents,7 0 and as to whether an analysis under the
67. The court in London v. Carson Piie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) stated:
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception, however, not
the rule, for if the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language
of patent claims can never be relied on, and that the doctrine of
equivalents is simply the second prong of every infringement charge,
regularly available to extend protection beyond the scope of the claims,
then the claims will cease to serve their intended purpose.
Id. at 1538; see also Charles Greiner & Co., Inc. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962
F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting the language from London, 946 F.2d
at 1538, indicating that application of the doctrine is the exception and not the
rule).
68. See supra notes 30-35, 66 and accompanying text (describing the trade-
off between notice and justice and citing authors who believe that courts should
restrict use of the doctrine of equivalents); see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 616 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating
that it is unjust to the public to construe the meaning of claims differently than
the plain meaning of the words and that the approach of the Graver Tank
majority will make enlargement of patent claims the "rule" rather than the
"exception").
69. See Brooks, supra note 58, at 228 (1994) (stating that with few
exceptions, the function-way-result test suffices as a reliable method for
determining equivalency without the need for equitable triggers); Sean T.
Moorhead, Note, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Rarely Actionable Non-Literal
Infringement or the Second Prong of Patent Infringement Charges?, 53 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1421, 1448 (1992) (arguing that the doctrine of equivalents should remain
the second prong of a patent infringement suit). Moorhead suggests that the
real problem is the doctrine becoming the only prong in an infringement suit,
because the inherent fuzziness of the doctrine will result in litigators having no
bright lines to guide them in making decisions, and will foster an attitude of
"when in doubt, bring suit." Id. at 1449. At the same time, Moorhead argues
that the doctrine prevents the copying of patents and allows for the proper
protection of patent rights, so that the doctrine should be available in every
infringement suit. Id.
70. Commenting on Graver Tank, Judge Lourie of the Federal Circuit
wrote:
Thus, the Court took account of the fact that there may be instances
in which the function-way-result tests may be satisfied, but the facts
may not justify the application of the doctrine of equivalents. This
might occur if independent research resulted in an invention or product
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doctrine should be an automatic part of an infringement case.
Supreme Court precedent remains unclear regarding
whether a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents is a factual question for the jury or for the judge."' The
Graver Tank Court explicitly stated that "[a] finding of equiva-
lence is a determination of fact."72 Because it is an equitable
remedy, many scholars consider this determination to be a
factual question for the judge and not a question for the jury.3
Recently, however, the Federal Circuit has allowed infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents to be a factual inquiry for the
jury.4 The controversy over whether a judge or jury should be
significantly different from what is claimed, albeit one that might
perform substantially the same function in the same way to obtain the
same result.
International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., Inc., 991 F.2d 768, 774
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (Lourie, J., concurring).
One recent federal district court decision noted that:
[T]here is some evidence in recent decisional law that the Federal
Circuit is moving toward a new conception of the doctrine of equiva-
lents, requiring not only a showing of equivalence under the tri-partite
fimction/way/result test articulated in Graver Tank ... but also a
showing of inequitable conduct on the part of the alleged infringer.
Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1167, 1180
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
71. The Graver Tank opinion did not state whether the factual question of
equivalency was a question for the judge or for the jury. The problem stems
from the Seventh Amendment and the equitable nature of the doctrine of
equivalents, with many considering the patentee's rights to be those that a
court of equity would have determined. See Stanley L. Amberg, Equivalents
and Claim Construction: Critical Issues En Banc in the Federal Circuit, in 1
PATENT LrrIGATION 713, 720-46 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. G-396, 1994) (concluding that there is a Seventh Amendment right
to trial by jury of all disputed factual questions necessary for an ultimate
determination of equivalency); Richard E. Backus, En Banc on Claim
Construction and Equivalents, in 1 PATENT LITIGATION 775, 793-96 (PLI Litig.
& Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. G-396, 1994) (presenting the
arguments in favor of the court deciding equivalency and for the right to a trial
by jury to determine equivalency).
72. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
73. See supra note 71 (discussing the equitable nature of the doctrine of
equivalents).
74. See, e.g., Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 1991), reh'g en banc denied, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2039 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1993) (stating that the "jury has historically been
charged with the factual inquiry of equivalency"); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy
Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (overturning a jury finding
of infringement and requiring that the party asserting infringement must
present evidence and argument concerning the doctrine and each of its elements
in order for the case to reach the jury).
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the fact finder for equivalence analysis parallels the larger
concern about the role of juries in many aspects of patent
trials." Many commentators feel that juries are dumbfounded
by the plethora of technical evidence and that they award
damage claims on a "gut-feeling."76
II. THE HILTON DAVIS DECISION
Hilton Davis owned a patent that claimed a purification
process for dyes using a set pore diameter for a filter, a pH
between 6 and 9, and a pressure between 200 and 400 p.s.i.g."
Hilton Davis learned that Warner-Jenkinson used a similar
process and sued Warner-Jenkinson in 1991.78 Warner-
Jenkinson's process used a pH of 5 and a pressure of 200 to 500
75. See generally Abolition of Jury Trials in Patent Cases, 34 IDEA 77
(1994) [hereinafter Abolition] (discussing the positive and negative aspects of
allowing juries to try patent cases); V. Bryan Medlock, Jr. & Garland P.
Andrews, Jury Trials in Patent Cases, in 2 PATENT LrIGATION 775, 793-96 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 321, 1991) (discussing the
right to a trial by jury and stating that only some issues are properly triable by
jury in patent cases).
76. See generally Abolition, supra note 75 (discussing the positive and
negative aspects of allowing juries to try patent cases).
77. The relevant portion of claim 1 of Hilton Davis's 4,560,746 patent for
an ultrafiltration process reads, "subjecting an aqueous solution ... to
ultrafiltration through a membrane having a nominal pore diameter of 5-15
Angstroms under a hydrostatic pressure of approximately 200 to 400 p.s.i.g., at
a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0, to thereby cause separation of said
impurities from said dye." Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
62 F.3d 1512, 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 1014 (1996). Claim 1 was the only independent claim in issue. Id. A
dependent claim specifies the product or process of another claim and then adds
further limitations. An independent claim is a claim that does not rely on or
claim the elements in another claim of the patent.
78. Hilton Davis and Warner-Jenkinson compete in the manufacturing of
dyes. Id. at 1515. Both companies worked on a process to remove impurities
from dyes so that the dyes conform to stringent governmental requirements for
purity for food or drugs. Id. Warner-Jenkinson tested its purification process
in 1982. Id. at 1516. The test was not successful, so Warner-Jenkinson ceased
work on the process until 1986. Id. The Warner-Jenkinson test was not
successful because it did not produce a sufficiently pure dye. Id. One week
after Warner-Jenkinson's test in 1982, Hilton Davis hired a company to test its
purification process. Id. Although the first test did not succeed, a second test
in 1983 successfully purified a dye. Id. at 1515. Hilton Davis filed a patent
application for the purifying process and the PTO issued the patent in 1985 for
that process. Id. Warner-Jenkinson developed its accused process in 1986. Id.
at 1516. Hilton Davis learned of Warner-Jenkinson's use of a purification
process similar to its patented process in 1989 and sued Warner-Jenkinson in
1991. Id.
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p.s.i.g."9 The Warner-Jenkinson process thus eluded the literal
language of the Hilton Davis patent, setting up a confrontation
over application of the doctrine of equivalents. At trial, the jury
found that Warner-Jenkinson infringed Hilton Davis's patent
under the doctrine of equivalents, and Warner-Jenkinson
appealed. 0
The Federal Circuit decided to hear the Hilton Davis case en
banc8' to address three issues. First, the court questioned
whether application of the doctrine of equivalents involves
anything in addition to the traditional function-way-result
test.82 The court next considered whether infringement under
the doctrine is a factual question for the jury or an equitable
remedy for the court.83 Finally, the court considered whether
the trial court has the discretion to decide whether to apply the
doctrine of equivalents in a patent infringement suit.
8 4
In a per curiam decision joined by only six judges of
twelve,85 the Federal Circuit chose to "restate-not to re-
79. Id. at 1516.
80. There was no literal infringement because the Warner-Jenkinson
process purified the dye at a different pH and pressure than the Hilton Davis
patent specified. Warner-Jenkinson appealed the jury findings, id., arguing
that the doctrine of equivalents is an equitable remedy available only upon a
showing of suitable equities and that the issue is a legal question for the court
and not for the jury. Id. at 1522. Consequently, Warner-Jenkinson argued, no
equitable basis for application of the doctrine of equivalents existed because
Hilton Davis presented no evidence of copying and Warner-Jenkinson developed
its process independently. Id. at 1523.
81. After a three judge panel heard oral argument on the case, the Federal
Circuit decided to rehear the appeal en banc to consider important issues
involving the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1516.
82. Id. at 1516.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Along with the per curiam decision, one concurring opinion and three
dissenting opinions were filed. Judge Newman fied a concurring opinion
stating that she believed the law in the per curiam decision was in accordance
with Supreme Court precedent, but questioning whether the doctrine of
equivalents remains the best way to achieve the result of adequate patent
protection. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1529 (Newman, J., concurring). Judge
Plager fied a dissenting opinion arguing that it is against the public interest
to allow both literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents to go to the jury in patent trials. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1542
(Plager, J., dissenting). Judge Plager wrote that "[tihe authority to exercise the
unique remedy which is the doctrine of equivalents lies exclusively in courts of
equity." Id. at 1543. Judge Lourie filed a dissenting opinion contending that
the substantiality of the differences is only one of the factors that a court should
consider in a doctrine of equivalents analysis, rather than the overall standard
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vise-the test for infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.""8 Although it acknowledged that courts frequently rely on
the function-way-result test,"7 the Federal Circuit cited Graver
Tank in concluding that "insubstantial" differences form the
necessary predicate for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents." The court noted that the function-way-result test
may suffice to show the substantiality of the differences, but it
is not "the test" for infringement under the doctrine.89 The
court noted that the fact finder may consider other evidence to
determine the substantiality of the differences, such as whether
a person of ordinary skill in the art of the invention would know
of the substantiality of the differences between the claimed and
accused devices.90
The Federal Circuit next determined the role of intent-
related evidence in equivalence analysis. The Hilton Davis court
held that evidence that an accused infringer copied a patented
device is relevant, not because the subjective mental state of the
under the doctrine, and that evidence of copying and independent development,
the pioneering status of the invention, and the knowledge of those skilled in the
art should be more important than the majority opinion considered them.
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1547 (Lourie, J., dissenting). Judge Lourie also
believed that the court improperly limited intent-related evidence, and that
intent should be considered in the application of the doctrine of equivalents. Id.
at 1548. Judge Nies, in dissent, argued that Supreme Court precedent presents
a series of questions of law, fact, and mixed law and fact in a doctrine of
equivalents analysis. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1150 (Nies, J., dissenting).
Judge Nies concluded that, as a matter of law, no infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents could be found in Hilton Davis. Id.
86. Id. at 1516.
87. Id. at 1517.
88. The Federal Circuit quoted the following Graver Tank language: "The
question which thus emerges is ... whether under the circumstances the
change was so insubstantial that the trial court's invocation of the doctrine of
equivalents was justified." Id. at 1517 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde
Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950)). "With this case, this court explicitly
holds that the application of the doctrine of equivalents rests on the substantial-
ity of the differences between the claimed and accused products or processes,
assessed according to an objective standard." Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1518.
89. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1518. The court noted that other evidence may
be relevant and as technology becomes more sophisticated the function-way-
result test may not always suffice to show the substantiality of the difference.
Id.
90. Id. at 1518-19. The Federal Circuit noted the Supreme Court's
language: "An important factor.., is whether persons reasonably skilled in the
art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained
in the patent with one that was." Id. at 1519 (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at
609).
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accused infringer is important, but because such evidence
suggests that the differences between the accused and patented
devices are insubstantial."' The court held that evidence of
copying weighs in favor of the patent owner.92  The court
reasoned that evidence of designing around93 a patented device
to attain a new device is relevant because it shows that the
alleged infringer may have made substantial changes to the
device to avoid infringement.94 Because designing around a
patent is not discouraged, the court concluded that this evidence
weighs in favor of the alleged infringer.9 5
The court reasoned that because intent is not an element of
infringement,96 evidence of copying and designing around is not
relevant to show the bad or good faith of the accused infringer,
but only to show the substantiality of the differences between
the accused and claimed devices.9 Evidence of independent
development, the court decided, is not relevant to infringement
under the doctrine.9" Because evidence of independent develop-
ment, unlike copying or designing around, shows that the
accused infringer had no knowledge of the patent, the court
concluded that this evidence "provides no information about the
substantiality of the differences."99
The Federal Circuit acknowledged references to the doctrine
of equivalents as equitable, but stated that "allusions to equity
invoke equity in its broadest sense-equity as general fair-
ness.""° Because the court believed equity does not refer to
the equitable powers of a court to decide factual issues, the
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 63 (describing "designing around" and why it is not
discouraged).
94. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519.
95. Id. at 1520.
96. Id. at 1519. "By considering evidence of copying, however, the Supreme
Court did not imply that infringement under the doctrine requires bad faith or
some other subjective component. Intent is not an element of infringement."
Id. Proof of bad faith by an infringer, which may include proof of copying, may
entitle the patent owner to attorneys fees or enhanced damages for willful
infringement. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-285 (1994).
97. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519-20.
98. Id. at 1520. The Hilton Davis court did note, however, that evidence of
independent development is relevant to refute a contention that the infringer
intentionally copied the invention, which may entitle the patent owner to
enhanced damages for willful infringement. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1521.
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opinion explicitly stated that infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is a question of fact for the jury. 0 ' Finally, the
Federal Circuit held that the trial judge does not have discretion
to choose whether to apply the doctrine of equivalents because
infringement is a factual question for the jury.'
The Federal Circuit next turned to the application of the law
to the facts of the case. Hilton Davis and Warner-Jenkinson
both offered evidence under the function-way-result test. In
light of the evidence offered, and because the function-way-result
test does provide one way to demonstrate insubstantial differenc-
es, the Federal Circuit affirmed the holding of the trial court of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.0 ° In finding
that Hilton Davis surrendered only pHs above 9 in amending its
claim during prosecution to specify a pH range from 6 to 9, the
court noted that it was only necessary to surrender pHs above
9 to overcome prior art.'0 4 Prosecution history estoppel, there-
fore, did not bar Hilton Davis from asserting its patent against
Warner-Jenkinson, whose process used a pH of 5.'0 In dis-
sent, Judge Nies argued that Hilton Davis intentionally specified
the pH range to overcome prior art."6 In support of her
argument, Judge Nies noted that an inventor testified that the
Hilton Davis process foamed undesirably if the pH dropped
below 6. i07
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS
DECISION
The wide scope of the issues in Hilton Davis presented the
Federal Circuit with an opportunity to restructure and simplify
doctrine of equivalents analysis to make it more predictable,
101. Id. at 1520-21. The court emphasized the Supreme Court's language
that application of the doctrine of equivalents is a question of fact. Id. (citing
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1853) and Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1950)).
102. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522.
103. Id. at 1525.
104. Id. The court stated that Hilton Davis amended the claim to specify a
pH from 6.0 to 9.0 to avoid the disclosure in another patent of an utrafiltration
process operating at a pH higher than 9.0. Id. The court therefore concluded
that Hilton Davis was not barred from asserting equivalency to processes
operating at a pH below 6.0. Id.
105. Id. at 1525.
106. Id. at 1582 (Nies, J., dissenting). Judge Nies argued that prosecution




while still providing the necessary protection for patentees.
Although the court did acknowledge that a test beyond the
function-way-result test will allow the doctrine of equivalents to
adapt to new technology, the court failed to structure a coherent
approach for intent-related evidence and to provide appropriate
limits to the successful inducement of the doctrine. Additionally,
the precendential value of the decision is questionable because
a majority of the court did not join any one opinion. 08
A. A DIVIDED FEDERAL CmcuIT CREATES NEW PROBLEMS
AFTER SOLVING THE OLD
1. The Federal Circuit Realizes the Need for a Broad
Infringement Test
Realizing that developing a simple test for the doctrine of
equivalents is impossible, the Hilton Davis court correctly
specified that the standard for infringement under the doctrine
rests on the substantiality of the differences between the claimed
and accused devices.0 9 The court noted that the function-way-
result test often suffices in this inquiry, but that as technology
becomes more sophisticated, the function-way-result test may
not always suffice to show the substantiality of the differenc-
es."0 More than a function-way-result test is essential to an
equivalence analysis, and the failure to consider other evidence
could lead to improper results."' This is particularly true in
the chemical field, where compound structures differ substantial-
ly, but perform the same function, provide the same result, and
108. Assuming that a per curiam opinion will receive due authority, the
opinion still could lack precedential authority. Of the twelve judges that heard
the case, six joined the per curiam opinion. Five justices dissented in the case,
so the precedential authority rests in the sole concurring opinion of Judge
Newman. Judge Newman's opinion suggests that further research and input
from the scientific community may provide a better solution to the doctrine of
equivalents. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1529 (Newman, J., concurring). The
degree of common support in Judge Newman's concurrence for the propositions
of the per curiam opinion is vague, because Judge Newman merely joined the
holding of the per curiam opinion and stressed her agreement that Graver Tank
controls the law of the doctrine of equivalents. Id.
109. Id. at 1518.
110. Id.
111. See International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg., 991 F.2d 768,773-
75 (Lourie, J., concurring) (discussing concerns that the function-way-result
test examines only what a device does, not what it is, and that courts should
consider other factors in addition to the function-way-result test).
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operate in virtually the same way."2 The Federal Circuit thus
properly held that the function-way-result test is not "the test"
for equivalency, and that other inquiries may help.
At a time when many scholars assert that trial courts
should limit application of the doctrine of equivalents," the
Hilton Davis decision suggests that courts will allow application
of the doctrine in virtually every infringement case."' Recent
Federal Circuit cases, however, have expressed concern over the
doctrine of equivalents becoming an automatic second prong in
every patent infringement case." 5  The proper emphasis
should rest on restraining the fact finder under the doctrine and
not on limiting application of it. In spite of the predictability
problems presented by the doctrine of equivalents becoming an
automatic second prong in infringement analysis," 6 courts
should allow the patent holder to present evidence for the
doctrine in every case.
Because the patent statute does not specify intent as an
element of infringement," 7 infringement should be a strict
liability offense. Many commentators, however, argue that
courts should employ the doctrine of equivalents only if they find
an equitable trigger, such as evidence of copying." 8 Whether
or not the accused infringer is aware of the patent, infringement
should remain a technical inquiry because the exclusive right to
practice an invention should not depend on another's state of
mind." '9 Under such an analysis, any device falling under the
scope of the patent claims should constitute an infringement,
regardless of the intent of the alleged infringer.
112. Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (Lourie, J., concurring).
113. See supra note 66 (citing those who believe that application of the
doctrine of equivalents should be limited).
114. See supra text accompanying note 102 (stating that the judge does not
have discretion in choosing whether to apply the doctrine of equivalents).
115. See supra note 67 (discussing concern about the doctrine of equivalents
becoming an automatic second prong in infringement cases).
116. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the problems the
public may have in determining the boundaries of patent protection).
117. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (asserting that intent is not
an element of infringement).
118. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (citing articles that discuss
the need for evidence of copying to trigger the doctrine of equivalents).




2. The Federal Circuit Fails to Limit Equivalence Analysis
and Confuses the Use of Intent-Related Evidence
The Hilton Davis court failed to provide adequate limits to
the application of the doctrine of equivalents and confused the
use of evidence relating to the intent of the accused infringer.
In addition to the automatic application of the doctrine and a
loosely defined test for infringement, the Federal Circuit did not
rigidly apply prosecution history estoppel. 120 The combination
of these factors leads to an overly broad infringement test that
does not appropriately limit successful inducement of the
doctrine.
The current approach of the Federal Circuit remains flawed
because it could result in frequent broadening of claims beyond
the literal claim language. This approach seems close to a
"central claiming" system under the guise of a "peripheral
system."12' The purpose of the claims to provide adequate
notice to the public is defeated if the judiciary frequently uses an
expansive doctrine of equivalents analysis to broaden the
protected subject matter beyond the literal claim language. 22
The Federal Circuit's broad infringement test also defeats the
PTO's purpose in selectively reviewing and issuing patents.
Under an expansive doctrine of equivalents analysis, the PTO
scrutinizes the patent prior to issuance, and the courts "broaden"
the claims during litigation. The Federal Circuit's current
approach borders on the philosophy of "central claiming," and
the doctrine needs limits to prevent frequent rewriting of patent
claims.
The Federal Circuit also failed to provide a coherent
approach to intent-related evidence, such as evidence of copying,
120. See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text (discussing the
prosecution history estoppel issue in Hilton Davis).
121. See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text (describing central and
peripheral claiming systems).
122. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing the tension
between notice to the public and justice for the patentee). If the doctrine of
equivalents is liberally applied in every case to expand the words of a patent
beyond the literal language in the claims, the public will never know with
certainty whether an improvement in existing patented technology will infringe
the patented device. See supra note 42 (discussing Justice Black's dissent in
Graver Tank).
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designing around, and independent development." Evidence
of copying, designing around, and independent development
relates to the intent of the accused infringer. The court,
however, stated that intent is not an element of infringe-
ment'24 and held that intent-related evidence is relevant only
to illustrate the objective differences between the accused and
claimed devices. Admission of intent-related evidence allows
patentees to argue bad faith of the accused in every infringement
case, which could increase the successful inducement of the
doctrine by confusing the fact finder with intent-related evidence
that is irrelevant to the objective technical aspects of the
case.
125
In addition to the expansive test endorsed by Hilton Davis,
the Federal Circuit erred in failing to rigidly apply built-in
limitations of the doctrine when applying the law to the facts of
the case. Specifically, the Federal Circuit allowed Hilton Davis
to recover matter arguably surrendered during prosecution of the
patent through the doctrine of equivalents. 26 Such a double-
edged sword of liberalism, a broad infringement test and loose
application of the law, favors the patentee and leaves the
accused infringer virtually defenseless in a close infringement
case.
B. AN EQUITABLE PROPOSAL FOR THE DOCTRInE OF
EQUIVALENTS
Commentators have suggested several alternative approaches
for the doctrine of equivalents, ranging from complete abolition
of the doctrine127 to use of the doctrine only when evidence of
123. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal
Circuit's approach to intent-related evidence).
124. See supra note 96 (quoting the Hilton Davis decision).
125. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (noting the problems
juries experience in patent cases).
126. See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text (discussing the
prosecution history estoppel issue in Hilton Davis).
127. Adelman and Francione propose elimination of the doctrine of
equivalents in most cases as a viable option when looking at the primary uses
of the doctrine: to recover unclaimed ground that was mistakenly excluded from
the patent and to cover new technical innovations that were not known at the
time the patent issued. Adelman & Francione, supra note 33, at 711-12. The
reissue process already is in place to recover mistakes in patent claiming. 35
U.S.C. § 251 (1994). After a patent issues, a patentee who thinks that its
claims are either too broad or too narrow can seek a reissue of the patent in
which the subject matter is amended, as long as no new matter is introduced
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copying exists.12 At a time when many commentators are
calling for abolition of the doctrine, the Federal Circuit should
provide adequate limits to successful inducement of the doctrine.
In forging a revised test for the doctrine of equivalents, the two
competing interests of protecting the patentee's exclusive right
to the invention and providing adequate notice to the public
remain preeminently important.'29
A more equitable approach to the doctrine of equivalents
would use the general test stated in Hilton Davis, but would
instruct jurors about the policy situations when use of the
doctrine is appropriate and would rigidly apply prosecution
history estoppel to limit the scope of the invention. This
approach would exclude any evidence relating to copying,
independent development, or designing around as irrelevant to
the technical merits of the inquiry and also as prejudicial toward
the accused infringer. This approach admittedly lacks the
predictability of using solely a literal infringement analysis, but
it would balance the need of providing notice to the public of
what infringes with achieving justice for the patentee.
1. Exclude All Evidence Relating to Intent of the Accused
Infringer
The right to exclude that a patent grants to a patentee
should not depend upon the infringer's state of mind, 8 ° and
although intent-related evidence may provide an equitable
element to the doctrine, it only confuses the issues by focusing
on the intent of the accused rather than the technical consider-
ations of the case. The Federal Circuit unnecessarily complicated
in the reissue. Id. Some courts argue that new technical innovations should
not be covered by older patents if the innovations do not fall under the literal
language of the claims. See Gould v. Rees, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 187, 194 (1872)
(stating that an accused does not infringe if she substitutes a new element not
known at the date of the patentee's invention). But see Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stressing that the inventor
is not required to predict all future developments). Adelman and Francione
assert that the law should accommodate public interest in alerting competitors
to the bounds of patent protection as long as doing so does not create an
injustice. Adelman & Francione, supra note 33, at 728-29.
128. This approach would seldom allow recovery, absent "smoking gun"
evidence of copying, because it is difficult to prove slavish copying.
129. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing the need for
balance between notice to the public and justice for the patentee).
130. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (indicating that infringement
is a strict liability offense).
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equivalence analysis by holding evidence of copying and
designing around relevant only to illustrate the substantiality of
the differences between the accused and claimed devices.
Evidence of copying and designing around establishes the
subjective motivation of the accused infringer. This evidence,
however, does not show the substantiality of the differences
between the claimed and accused devices as the Hilton Davis per
curiam opinion suggests.' 3 ' Rather, evidence of designing
around indicates the intent to develop a device that is substan-
tially different from the claimed device. Similarly, evidence of
copying indicates intent to make slight changes to avoid the
language of the claims. Evidence of copying and designing
around, therefore, logically illustrates the accused infringer's
state of mind.1
2
The difference between copying and designing around is
merely a matter of degree. 33  Until recently, courts invoked
the doctrine of equivalents only if there was no literal infringe-
131. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (discussing intent-related
evidence in Hilton Davis).
132. Evidence of independent development, like evidence of designing
around, demonstrates good faith on behalf of the accused infringer. See supra
note 63 (discussing the positive effects of designing-around). Although the
Graver Tank decision is silent as to the role of intent in the doctrine of
equivalents, it does suggest that evidence of independent research would have
alleviated the accused of liability. See supra note 64 and accompanying text
(quoting Graver Tank's references to independent development). The Federal
Circuit, however, has reduced evidence of independent research to a secondary
defense only to rebut evidence of copying. See supra note 98 (discussing the
Hilton Davis court's view that independent development may only be used to
rebut a charge of copying). The Graver Tank opinion does not explicitly state
that the court would have alleviated the accused of liability if it presented
evidence of independent research.
133. Both copying and designing around a patent involve examining a patent
and ensuring that the accused device is not exactly the same. If an accused
device is an exact copy, it should literally infringe the patent. Therefore, if the
doctrine of equivalents is invoked in a case because the accused device is not
exactly the same as that set out in the patent claims, the technical differences
between copying and designing around become merely a matter of degree.
Judge Lourie in his Hilton Davis dissent stated:
One may readily envision a spectrum consisting of copying on one
extreme, independent development on the other, and designing around
somewhere in between. ... The difference between copying and
designing around is often a matter of degree, depending upon whether
one succeeds or not in getting far enough away from the claims to
avoid a finding of infringement.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1547-48 (Fed.




ment."' The accused device, therefore, could not have been an
exact copy of the claimed device and must have been different in
some respect to invoke the doctrine of equivalents. Under an
equivalence analysis, the difference between evidence of copying
and designing around is not apparent. Evidence of copying and
designing around both show the same thing-that the accused
infringer used the patented device in the designing of the
product. Intent-related evidence demonstrates nothing further
and, therefore, there is no logical reason to weigh evidence of
copying against the accused and evidence of designing around in
favor of the accused infringer. In spite of this, under the Federal
Circuit's analysis, evidence of copying hinders the accused
infringer, while evidence of designing around helps the accused
infringer.135
Designing around is a positive consequence of the patent
system,"3 6 but the Hilton Davis decision may discourage at-
tempts of competitors to design around patents. A competitor
may design around a patent, but claim expansion could make
the design around look like copying. In such a case, the
patentee could use the competitor's design around evidence as
evidence of copying. The overall effect could reduce attempts to
design around patents and may negatively impact scientific
progress.
A further problem with the Federal Circuit's scheme for
evidence of copying and designing around is its incongruence
with the law of evidence. Evidence of copying may be used only
to show the insubstantiality of the differences between the
accused and claimed devices, yet this evidence is strongly
prejudicial against the accused infringer. Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 allows the exclusion of evidence if the danger of
unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues outweighs the value
of the evidence. 3 ' The danger of prejudice outweighs the
benefit of allowing this intent-related evidence because despite
134. See supra note 67 (citing cases stating that the doctrine of equivalents
is the exception rather than the rule in patent infringement cases).
135. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Hilton
Davis approach to intent-related evidence).
136. See supra note 63 (discussing the positive aspects of designing around).
137. FED. R. EviD. 403 (1995). This rule reads: "Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Id.
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any limiting instructions, the jury may consider the mental state
of the accused infringer in reaching a verdict. In addition,
admitting intent-related evidence may confuse the issues by
causing the jury to focus on subjective intent rather than on the
substantiality of the differences.
One problem with excluding intent-related evidence is that
it will force courts to bifurcate patent infringement cases. Proof
of bad faith may entitle a patentee to enhanced damages."'
Excluding evidence related to the subjective motivation of the
accused infringer will require courts first to determine the
infringement issue, and then, if necessary, to hold a separate
trial for damages. Bifurcated trials will likely be more expensive
and time consuming. Despite these faults, the benefit to the
parties in excluding this prejudicial evidence outweighs the
disadvantages of bifurcated trials."9
2. Proper Use of the Hilton Davis Court's "Substantiality of
the Differences" Test
Although the Hilton Davis per curiam opinion clearly
articulated the substantiality of the differences test, a fact finder
requires more guidance in determining if the differences between
the claimed and accused devices are substantial.4 ° Fact
finders are likely to be confused, for example, by an infringement
finding hinging on insubstantial differences when the fact finder
138. Evidence of bad faith may entitle the patent owner to enhanced
damages for willful infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) (allowing courts to
triple the damages assessed at trial upon a finding of willful infringement); see
also Read Corp. v. Protec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (describing
the necessities for a willful infringement finding). In establishing infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, however, evidence of copying is applicable
only to a showing of insubstantial changes between the accused and claimed
devices and not toward intent. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d 1519.
139. Bifurcated trials eliminate the danger that an accused infringer will be
prejudiced by allowing a determination of liability before intent-related evidence
reaches the fact finder. Cf Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 643-
44 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (recommending that trial courts give serious consideration
to separate trials for liability and willfulness to avoid prejudice in patent cases
where certain attorney-client privilege issues are involved); see also John A.
Dragseth, Note, Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Opinions of
Counsel in Patent Litigation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1996) (arguing against the
use of evidence of a patentee's withholding of an infringement opinion to draw
an inference of willful infringement in a nonbifurcated trial).
140. A straight-forward test for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is difficult to formulate because it must be applicable to a variety
of technologies and malleable to fit many different fact scenarios.
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has little prior knowledge of the technology. The law needs to
provide constraints to help the fact finder determine when
application of the doctrine of equivalents is proper.
One method of assisting fact finders to focus on the proper
uses of the doctrine of equivalents includes utilizing policy
considerations to restrain application of the doctrine. A patentee
seeks protection under the doctrine in two situations: to correct
"mistakes" in the claiming and drafting of the application and to
protect against a technological innovation that occurs after the
patent issues.'4 ' Because the patent system allows very broad
claims, courts should expect patentees to seek protection for as
much material as possible. If an accused device remains outside
the broad scope of the literal patent claim language, protection
under the doctrine is appropriate only if the patentee intended,
but failed, to cover the accused device.
Use of the doctrine is inappropriate if the patentee seeks to
protect subject matter that was intentionally excluded during
the application process. 42  A patentee may intentionally
decline to claim subject matter either because of patentability
concerns 43 or because the subject matter does not fall under
the scope of the invention. The patentee may also fail to claim
subject matter because the patentee did not believe the product
would operate correctly at specific parameters. In such cases,
broadening of the claims to cover the subject matter is inappro-
priate. The doctrine of equivalents should protect subject matter
only if the patentee intended to cover the subject matter but
failed to claim it unintentionally.'4
Courts should utilize this policy constraint by instructing
the jury that patentees may only receive protection for subject
matter that they did not claim unintentionally. If objective
evidence is offered at trial that the patentee did not believe the
141. Adelman & Francione, supra note 33, at 711. Correcting mistakes in
claiming is the most frequent situation. Id. at 715.
142. This inquiry closely parallels the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel. Adelman & Francione, supra note 33, at 715-16 n.180; see also
ERNEST B. LscoMB I, LipscOMB's WALKER ON PATENTS § 21:4 (3d ed. 1987)
(stating that a patentee's appraisal of the nature of his invention is of great
importance).
143. See supra note 14 (describing requirements for patentability).
144. An example of failing to claim subject matter unintentionally is when
technological changes prevent the patentee from claiming it. See supra note 33
(describing equivalence when the patentee fails to claim later-developed
technology).
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product would work at specific parameters or that the extended
matter was outside the realm of what the patentee considered
the true scope of the invention, the patentee should not be able
to cover this subject matter under the doctrine of equivalents.
If the fact finder considers this restraint as a further limitation
in applying the doctrine of equivalents, improper use of the
doctrine will decrease.
3. Rigidly Apply Prosecution History Estoppel
Courts should rigidly apply prosecution history estoppel in
infringement cases because rigid use of this well-established
limitation will constrain inequitable application of the doctrine
of equivalents. Courts currently inquire into the purpose for
which a patentee made an amendment during prosecution for a
patent and limit patentees only with respect to the purpose for
which the patentee made the amendment.'45 The Federal
Circuit endorsed this approach by allowing Hilton Davis to
recover protection for pHs below 6, even though Hilton Davis
surrendered pHs below 6 during prosecution.
46
The law should strictly hold the patentee to claim limita-
tions when the patentee alters claim language in the prosecution
of the patent. It may seem inconsistent to allow the patentee
extended protection for the original claim language of the
invention, yet to strictly limit it to the changes made during
amendments to the patent. Such limitation, nevertheless, is
proper because the patentee intentionally surrendered the
subject matter to obtain the patent.
The patentee has every opportunity to re-think the invention
after a rejection from the PTO, and an amended claim will likely
reflect the true nature of the invention. In amending the claims,
an inventor is forced to figure out what sets her invention apart
from the prior art, so the amendment is more likely to precisely
relate to what the inventor thought encompassed the true scope
of the invention. The law should therefore hold the inventor
accountable for this intentional narrowing of the protected
145. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the need to
determine the reason why a patentee makes an amendment for prosecution
history estoppel).
146. See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text (explaining the Hilton
Davis holding on the prosecution history estoppel issue).
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subject matter regardless of the reason for the amendment. 147
C. HILTON DAVIS UNDER THE EQUITABLE APPROACH
Hilton Davis would become a simple case under this
equitable approach. Though Warner-Jenkinson did present
evidence of independent development,4 ' this evidence would
be inadmissible to bias the fact finder. The analysis would then
focus solely on the technical merits of the case.
In considering the policy concerns for application of the
doctrine of equivalents, the fact finder would need to consider
whether Hilton Davis intentionally failed to claim pHs below the
lower limit of 6," or whether Hilton Davis set this limit only
as a rough guide and mistakenly failed to claim pHs below this
value. Hilton Davis intentionally set the lower limit of 6 in the
claim. 5° In fact, an inventor found that the process foamed
undesirably if the pH dropped below 6.' Because Hilton
Davis intentionally failed to claim the process for pHs below 6,
policy concerns would restrain the successful application of the
doctrine to broaden Hilton Davis's claims.
A rigid application of prosecution history estoppel would
reinforce the decision to relieve Warner-Jenkinson of liability.
Hilton Davis modified the patent during prosecution to specify
"at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0." Although the plurality
opinion notes that Hilton Davis added this limitation only to
limit the process to pHs below 9,152 Hilton Davis intentionally
set the level at "6.0 to 9.0."' 53 Rigid application of prosecution
history estoppel would hold Hilton Davis to pHs between 6 and
9. Under this equitable proposal for the doctrine of equivalents,
a court would relieve Warner-Jenkinson of liability.
147. Strictly limiting the patentee to amended claim language without
regard to the reason for the amendment contradicts established precedent,
which holds patentees to amended language only when the change was
necessary to overcome prior art. See supra note 55 (discussing the current law
of prosecution history estoppel).
148. See supra note 78, 80 (discussing the facts of Hilton Davis).
149. See supra notes 104-107 (describing Hilton Davis's amendment to
specify a lower pH of 6).
150. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Nies'
opinion that Hilton Davis intentionally set the lower pH limit).
151. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1582 (Nies, J., dissenting).
152. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (describing the Hilton Davis
per curiam decision).
153. See supra note 106-107 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Nies'
opinion that Hilton Davis intentionally set the lower pH limit).
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CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's current doctrine of equivalents
analysis not only fails to adequately limit the application of the
doctrine, but also allows introduction of evidence that unfairly
prejudices the accused infringer. Although a rigid test for
infringement under the doctrine remains virtually impossible to
define, other methods may prove more equitable toward the
parties. The current analysis conceals an expansive approach of
broadening the claims at trial under the guise of a peripheral
claiming system designed to give notice to infringers prior to
litigation. A better method would use policy concerns to limit
the application of the doctrine, while rigidly applying prosecution
history estoppel to further restrain the doctrine. Courts would
also exclude evidence of copying, designing around, and indepen-
dent development as irrelevant to infringement. This approach
would put the word "equity" back into the equitable doctrine of
equivalents.
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